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THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE DISABILITY ACT
FROM THE STANDPOI NT OF THE CLAIMANT
EDWARD J. SCHEUNEMANN
of the Denver Bar

The Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act' at first
blush appears to be a humanitarian measure modeled after the
accident compensation acts and designed to spread the risks and
compensate the losses from diseases arising out of and in the
course of employment. A disabled workman seeking compensation for an industrial disease under the Act, however, is likely to
be thoroughly disillusioned the first time he consults a lawyer, for
he will learn that the Act is extremely limited in coverage, that
the burden of proof he must assume is virtually unbearable, and
that his rights are rigidly confined by harsh procedural provisions.
The Act has been in effect for slightly over five years. In that
period only an insignificant number of claims have been heard by
the Industrial Commission, an even fewer number have been compensated, and the Colorado Supreme Court has not been called upon
to decide a single case arising under the Act.
Substantially all of the compensation acts covering accidents,
and a majority of the state laws covering occupational diseases,
provide for compensation for any accident or disease arising out
of and in the course of the employment whether the disability is
total or partial, temporary or permanent.2 The Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act is restricted, however, in three important respects: First, not all diseases contracted as result of
employment are covered but only a specific list of 21 selected diseases; Second, not all disabilities resulting from the selected diseases are compensable but only total disability; and Third, even
total disability resulting from a covered disease is not compensable
unless the disability is of 30 days duration or longer-or, in the
case of silicosis and asbestosis-is total and permanent.
Although the Colorado Act is above average among those
listing specific diseases in the number listed, there are a number
of recognized and fairly common occupational diseases which are
not included such as anthrax, tularemia, various dermatoses, and
conditions arising from muscular fatigue or continued and re4
peated small trauma, sometimes called synovitis or tenosynositis.
A very significant omission is the failure to list any of the diseases
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 23 (1935).
2 United States Department of Labor, Bulletin No. 125.
'COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 456 and 458 (1935).
4 In some states this condition has been compensated as an accident since it Is
traumatic In origin, but the Colorado Industrial Commission has held that it does not

come within the Workmen's Compensation Act.
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which arise out of work with radioactive materials and irradiating
apparatus.5
New types of diseases resulting from occupational exposure
are constantly being recognized, and with the continual change
in materials used and working conditions in industry it is difficult
to see how any act which relies solely on a specific list of diseases
can provide effective coverage. The modern trend in such legislation is clearly away from the listing of specific diseases and
toward general coverage under which any disease which can be
shown to have its origin in the employment is compensable. The
National Conferences on Labor Legislation and other representative groups, such as the International Association of Industrial
Accident Boards and Commissions, have repeatedly stressed the
coverage instead of coverage limited to
importance of general
7
specified diseases.
ONLY TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSABLE

Even though the disabled workman may have one of the
specific diseases listed in Section 9 of the Act, he may not be
entitled to compensation because only total disability is compensable. Moreover, "disability" is defined in such a way in the
Act as to give rise to endless litigation as to its meaning. The
courts have customarily taken into consideration a claimant's ability to perform the work he was doing when he was injured and his
training and experience to do other kinds of work in measuring
disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act." It is at least
open to debate whether the courts could consider such factors in
determining whether there is total disability under the Occupational Disease Act, for Section 4 (b) defines "total disability" as
"the event of becoming physically incapacitated . . . from performing any work for remuneration or profit." Taken literally, the
definition could be construed to mean that any man who is capable
of selling newspapers on a street corner or sitting at a desk cannot be considered totally disabled.
From the standpoint of society there is far greater need for
effective compensation for partial disability than for total disability because it is so much more common. In the accident field
for instance, the 21st Report of the Colorado Industrial Commission reveals that there were ten times more cases of partial disability compensated during the period July 1, 1948 to June 30,
1950 than cases of total disability. Moreover, many occupational
diseases, such as silicosis and lead poisoning, frequently result in
The British Parliament in 1948 found the prevalence of these diseases sufficiently
important to justify a separate act, the Radioactive Substances Act, 11 & 12 Geo.,
VI, c. 37.
6 Note 2. Supra.
7 Acee, State Workmen's Compensation Legislation in 1947, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW. Oct. 1947.
8 Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Colo. 526, 186 Pac. 522 (1920).
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years of partial disability before the workman becomes totally
incapacitated. During those years he will find it impossible to
pass a medical examination for employment in practically any
large industry in Colorado. Frequently, his condition bars him
from any work for which he can qualify by training or experience-yet under the Colorado Act he is not entitled to any compensation whatever for the loss of his livelihood. The Colorado
act in this respect too is more restrictive than those of a majority
of the states having occupational disease legislation.
Finally, even though the workman may be totally disabled
from a disease listed in the Act, he still may not be entitled to
compensation because the disability lasts less than 30 days or is
total for less than 30 days and then becomes partial. 10 A workman under the Colorado Act who is totally disabled and
loses his entire earnings for 6 weeks would be entitled to a total
compensation award of $34.00. The amount involved hardy justifies the filing of a claim much less the tremendous expenditure of
time, expense, and effort necessary to make the proof required
under the Act in a contested case. Here again, in requiring such
an extreme "waiting period," Colorado is out of step with a majority of the other states."
RIGOROUS REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF
Even in the extremely limited number of cases where the workman is totally disabled from one of the listed diseases and where
his total disability is of more than 30 days duration, he may
well find that he is denied compensation because he cannot meet
the rigorous requirements of proof set out in the Act.
He is required to prove that there is a direct causal connection between the disease and the conditions under which his
work is performed; that the disease was a result of exposure-occasioned by the nature of his employment and can be traced to
the employment as a proximate cause; and that the disease was
incidental to the character of the business and not independent
of the relation of employer and employee. These requirements
are not unusual and, in practice, amount to the requirement in
accident cases that the disability arise out of and in the course
of employment. However, the Occupational Disease Act adds a
specific additional requirement-that the claimant "establish each
and every fact by competent medical evidence.' 1 2 This restriction of the type of proof to one particular kind of evidence seems
inconsistent with the humanitarian purposes for which compensation acts are usually enacted.
Furthermore, he is required to prove that the disability resulted within 120 days from the last "injurious exposure"-or in
'U. S. Department of Labor, Chart VI-Workinen's Compensation-Silicosis (1946).
"COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 456 (1935).
" Note 9, supra.
(1935).
"CoLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 451 (a)
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the case of silicosis and asbestosis-within 2 years."' This provision undoubtedly eliminates a large number of cases which
would otherwise be compensable. In cases of pulmonary fibrosis
produced by exposure to toxic materials, for instance, the disability may not result until many months or even years after the
14
exposure which introduced the toxic materials into the lungs.
The same principle is true in cases of lead poisoning and benzol
poisoning which act slowly upon the blood supply, eventually
producing an anemia which is totally disabling and sometimes
fatal. 15 Similar unrealistic and unnecessary limitations are contained in the act with respect to death claims. 16
This element of proof is further complicated by the definition of "injurious exposure" in Section 4 (g) of the Act as "that
concentration of toxic materials which would, independently of
any other cause whatsoever (including the previous physical condition of the claimant) produce or cause the disease for which
claim is made." The definition is open to varying interpretations.
One of them is that a man with an inherent or acquired susceptibility to certain toxic materials should be denied compensation
ufiless he can show that the concentration was sufficiently great
to have caused the disease in a man without such susceptibility.
Another is that compensation should be denied in every case unless
the claimant can show by scientific samples that there were sufficient toxic materials present in his working atmosphere to satisfy
the so-called "standards of tolerance" established by expert medical testimony or published by such departments as the Department
of Labor with respect to specified materials.
PROOF OUT OF WORKMAN'S FINANCIAL REACH

This type of proof is utterly beyond the reach of the average
employee. In silicosis cases, for example, the proof necessary to
show a sufficient concentration of free silica in the atmosphere
requires the taking of dust samples from the air at the working
level by expert operators using complicated and expensive machinery for weeks and even months, and the analysis of such dust
samples to determine the number of dust particles per cubic foot
of air and the number of particles of free silica in the dust are
measured down to the fineness of twenty-five thousands of an inch
(1 micron) in size. 17 Not only does the average disabled workman lack the financial resources to make such extremely expensive
and complicated tests, but it is doubtful whether he has the legal
"3CoLo. STAT. ANN., c. 97, § 451, (c. and e.) (1935).
Sappington, Medico-Legal Phases of Occupational Diseases, p. 112 (1939).
See discussion of report by Dr. Paul Reznikoff in Discussion of Industrial Accidents and Diseases, Bulletin 105, U. S. Dept. of Labor pp. 91-112. Sappington, op. cit.
n. 14.
"6CoLo. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 452 (1935).
1 One of the standards of "allowable concentrations" suggested by the Department
of Labor for the guidance of employers in preventing silicosis, for instance, is 5,000,000
particles of free silica dust (under 10 microns in size) per cubic foot of air. AnthracoSilicosis Cause and Prevention, Industrial Health Series No. 2, U. S. Department of
I'

'a

Labor.

February, 1951

DICTA

right to install such equipment and operators on his employer's
premises in order to do so. Even then, he lacks the necessary control over the materials and methods used in his employment to
make sure that the tests are truly representative of the conditions
under which he was exposed, and, of course, he doesn't even know
that such tests are necessary until after he has become totally disabled and has left the working atmosphere.
Some courts have recognized the injustice of this requirement
of proof and have held that where the claimant shows that he is exposed to a toxic material and produces medical evidence that he
is suffering from an occupational disease which results from such
exposure he has a prima facie case, and the burden of proof then
shifts to the employer to present evidence based on scientific tests
of the atmosphere.18 In simple cases where an employee has
worked only for one employer and in one job such a prima facie
case can be made because a medical expert can justifiably infer
that the employee was "injurisously exposed" when he knows
that the toxic material was present and that the employee has
the disease which he could not have contracted elsewhere. However, when the employee has worked for several different employers or in several different jobs for one employer it is often impossible, on the basis of medical examination alone, to infer on conclude where the "last injurious exposure" occurred.
Other states have attacked the problem more directly by providing that any exposure to a toxic material is presumed to be
injurious unless the employer proves otherwise. 19 In the light of
the realities of occupational diseases, and in consideration of the
employer's possession and control of the proof, this would seem
to be a logical place for the burden of proof.
TIME LIMITATIONS ON FILING DISHEARTENING
Perhaps the most disheartening provision of all to the
disabled workman (and his attorney) is the limitation upon the
time for filing claims. Section 11 of the Act provides that compensation is forever barred unless written claim is filed within
60 days after the date of disablement, br in the case of benzol
and its deritive, 90 days, or in the case of silicosis and asbestosis,
one year. -0 These limitations would seem to be reasonable enough
in the case of accidents where in the usual circumstances the
employee is immediately aware of the occurrence of the accident
and the resultant disability, and is on notice that he should do
something to obtain compensation. This is not true in many cases
11Oldman Boiler Works v. McManigal, 58 F. Supp. 697 (N.Y. 1944); HarbisonWalker Refractories v. lHarmon, 114 Ind. App. 144, 51 N.E. 2d 398 (1943); UTACarbon Coal Co. v. Commission, 104 Utah 567, 140 P. 2d 649 (1943) ; Walter Bledsoe &
Co. v. Baker, 83 N.E. 2d 620 Ind. App. (1949).
191939 ARIz. CODE, 56-1213 (c) with respect to Silicosis; Laws of N. Y. '47 Supp.
p. 1166.
"CoLO.
STAT. ANN., c. 97, § 453 (a)
& (B)
(1935).
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of occupational disease. It is a characteristic of many such diseases that they are slow in onset and gradually cumulative in
effect. There is often nothing in the external circumstances to indicate to the employee that he has incurred an occupational disease, and in many instances the disability is understandably attributed to non-compensable conditions such as colds, rheumatism, or arthritic. Moreover, even where the employee seeks medical advice and treatment he may not discover that he has a disease
which is compensable until after the limitation for filing the claim
has expired, because it is also characteristic of many occupational
diseases that they are difficult to diagnose until after repeated
medical examination and treatment. 21 Miss Mary Donlon, Chairman of the New York Workmen's Compensation Board and president of the International Association of Industrial Accident
Boards and Commissions, has expressed the problem as follows :22
Requirements for prompt claim filing which are fair enough in
accident cases, are often unsuitable or manifestly unfair in cases
where occupational disease develops slowly and where symptoms are
latent for such long periods that diagnosis relating disability to occupational exposure often is made too late in the case history to permit
claimants to file their claims within a short claim filing period.

Some states have sought to solve this problem by basing the
limitation period on the "first distinct manifestation" of the disease; others use the first time upon which the employee knows
or has occasion to know that he is suffering a disability from an
occupational disease. 23 Both of these techniques, however, raise
difficult problems of proof. Perhaps the most satisfactory method
is that used in the Workmen's Compensation Act of Colorado where
specific limits are provided for the filing of claims but with discretion in the Industrial Commission to excuse late filings where
and where the employer's rights are not
reasonable grounds 2 exist
4
thereby prejudiced.
No

ACT AT ALL MAY BE PREFERABLE

The Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act is so limited
in coverage, so restrictive in application, and so harsh in its procedural provisions as to give rise to the possibility that a disabled workman and society in general would be better off if the
Act was entirely repealed. At least before passage of the Act, the
workman had the possibility of a common-law remedy against his
employer. Under Section 8 of the Act, that remedy is now barred.
The language of that section is so sweeping as to abolish the employer's liability:
*' Sappington. op cit., Note 14, ch. V.
2 Note 15. supra.
" 1949 GEN. STATS. Of CONN., § 7442" 1949 Wisec. STATS., § 102.12.
4COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, § 363 (1935).
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on account of any disease or injury to health, or on account of death
from any disease or injury to health, in any way contracted, sustained or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of
or arising out of his employment, except only an injury compensable
as an injury by accident under the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Colorado.

Taken at face value this section purports to wipe out common
law liability even for diseases which are not compensable under
the Act. The net result of five years of operation of the Act appears to be complete protection to employers and their insurance
from any liability for occupational diseases whatever at the expense of the disabled workmen.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH TAFT-HARTLEY HAS
SUPERSEDED STATE LABOR LAWS
PHILIP HORNBEIN, JR.
of the Denver Bar

When Congress has "occupied a field," state legislation therein is precluded since "a concurrent power in two district sovereignties to regulate the same thing involves ***** a moral and physical
impossibility." 1 The Taft-Hartley law 2 is a comprehensive measure
governing labor relations which affect interstate commerce. Many
states, including Colorado, now have labor relations laws of their
own, and the question of whether state or federal law is controlling
in a particular case is arising with increasing frequency.
There are three types of cases in which this problem may
occur: (1) representation cases-i. e. proceedings for the selection of a collective bargaining representative; (2) proceedings to
authorize the execution of a union-shop agreement; (3) actions,
either civil or criminal, growing out of statutory violations which
are termed "unfair labor practices."
Of course there is no problem presented in any case where
Taft-Hartley can definitely be ruled out of the picture because
interstate commerce is not "affected." '3 However, the nebulous
character of the concept of interstate commerce is well known
and the power of the National Labor Relations Board and other
federal agencies has, in recent years, been extended to activities
4
Still
formerly considered to be purely intrastate in character.
the courts reiterate that there is a line beyond which the federal
'Passenger Cases 7 How. 283, 399 (1849) ; U. S. Constitution, Article VI.
-61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. sec. 141 et seq. (1947).
3 The National Labor Relations Board can act only in cases "affecting commerce"
which is defined to mean "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the
free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.' Ibid. sec. 2(7).
4E.g. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); N.R.L.B. v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters, 181 Fed. 2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950). Cf. Groneman v. International Brotherhood of Electrical workers, 177 Fed. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1949).

